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REIMAGINING CONTENT MODERATION:
SECTION 230 AND THE PATH TO INDUSTRYGOVERNMENT COOPERATION
Yeva Mikaelyan *
In February 2020, the Ninth Circuit held that YouTube, as a private
entity, does not have to provide First Amendment protections to its content
creators. The holding was not surprising or groundbreaking, but the case
served as catalyst in the discussion of how platforms should moderate content. This was further amplified when over the summer, Twitter started to
add warnings under some of President Donald Trump’s tweets. In response,
the President called to “REVOKE 230.”
“230” refers to Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. At a
high level, Section 230 allows platforms to moderate content at their discretion without fear of liability. But today, platforms dominate much of the
national discourse and heavily influence politics and government. This Note
explores the role of Section 230 in today’s social media-dominated world
and critiques the recent push to regulate Section 230. This Note argues that
the First Amendment and government intervention are ineffective and dangerous tools in Section 230 regulation. Instead, this Note proposes a collaborative industry-government approach that balances on the needs of social
media platforms, government, users, and content creators.

J.D. Candidate, 2021, LMU Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. The author would like to thank
Professor Aaron Caplan for his incredible guidance and support throughout this process. Professor
Caplan, thank you for constantly challenging and improving my ideas. The author would also like
to thank Jameson Evans, Natalie Kalbakian, Fernanda Sanchez Jara, and the entire staff of Loyola
of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review for their hard work, feedback, and support on this Note.
Finally, the author would like to thank Alena McLucas for taking one of our midnight conversations
down the rabbit hole that spawned the idea for this Note.
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INTRODUCTION

Early on the morning of May 29, 2020, the President of the United
States, Donald Trump, posted a tweet. 1 It read: “REVOKE 230!” 2
Though it was only two words, the Tweet spoke to an issue brewing for
years in the internet space—whether the government should regulate content
on social media platforms or whether platforms should continue to regulate
themselves.
A few days before posting the tweet, President Trump tweeted that allowing mail-in voting would lead to mass voter fraud and lead to a “Rigged
Election.” 3 Twitter responded by adding a warning below his tweet and flagging it as false and misleading. 4 Throughout the next few months, Twitter
continued to add warning labels under President Trump’s tweets 5 and committed to flagging other false and misleading information on the platform. 6
The ability of Twitter to flag and add warnings to his tweets was the
exact reason that President Trump had called to revoke “230.” “230” refers
to section 230 (“Section 230”) of the Communications Decency Act

1. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 29, 2020, 8:15 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1266387743996870656 [https://archive.is/iBmsK].
2. Id.
3. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 26, 2020, 5:17 AM), https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1265255835124539392 [https://archive.is/XJ8eS].
4. Trump Makes Unsubstantiated Claim That Mail-In Ballots Will Lead to Voter Fraud,
TWITTER (May 26, 2020), https://twitter.com/i/events/1265330601034256384 [https://archive.is
/YMrHI].
5. During the national protests in the aftermath of George Floyd’s killing, President Trump
tweeted that the military would intervene if the protests involved looting, tweeting “when the looting starts, the shooting starts.” Twitter added a content warning to the tweet, asserting that the
tweet was “glorifying violence” but that it would not be taken down because “it may be in the
public’s best interest for the Tweet to remain accessible.” Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump),
TWITTER (May 28, 2020, 9:53 AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status
/1266231100780744704 [https://archive.is/Ghu6u].
6. Lauren Feiner, Twitter CEO Stands by Fact-Check on Trump’s Tweets as the White
House Prepares an Executive Order on Social Media Bias, CNBC (May 28, 2020, 10:22 AM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/28/twitter-ceo-stands-by-fact-check-on-trumps-tweets.html
[https://perma.cc/3J48-BBUM].
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(“CDA”), 7 a law that was passed in 1996 because of growing concern that
minors could easily access pornography on the internet. 8 Though the Supreme Court of the United States deemed many parts of the CDA unconstitutional, Section 230 remains in effect. 9 At a high level, Section 230 provides platforms with broad authority to remove user-generated content as
they see fit and shields them from civil liability for most content moderation
decisions. 10
The ability of platforms to censor content at their discretion often
causes tension 11 between regulators, platforms, content creators, and users. 12
In February 2020, these tensions flared when content creator Prager University opposed a content moderation decision by Google’s video hosting platform, YouTube. 13 Prager University is not a traditional university. 14 It is “a
7. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2018).
8. William A. Sodeman, Communications Decency Act, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA
(Nov. 24, 2016), https://www.britannica.com/topic/Communications-Decency-Act [https://
perma.cc/8BPL-YH3Y].
9. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 844 (1997) (holding that the portions of the CDA banning
“indecency” and “offensive” material are unconstitutional); CDA 230: The Most Important Law
Protecting Internet Speech, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/cda230/legislative-history [https://perma.cc/5EM2-WVWW].
10. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2); Section 230’s protections and limitations are described in greater
detail in Part III.
11. E.g., Michelle Castillo, Why Some YouTube Stars Are Angry at the Platform, CNBC
(Sept. 7, 2016, 3:13 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/09/07/why-some-youtube-stars-are-angryat-the-platform.html [https://perma.cc/UE7Y-PFG8] (discussing that YouTube creators are angry
at the platform for censoring sensitive content); Kevin Roose, The President Versus the Mods, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 16, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/29/technology/trump-twitter.html
[https://perma.cc/Q3W4-DH6X] (discussing Twitter users who are angry about Twitter’s warnings
on some of President Trump’s tweets).
12. This article frequently uses the terms “content creator” and “user.” For the purposes of
this article, a content creator is a person or group that creates and posts user-generated content, such
as someone who posts a YouTube video or a tweet. A user is a person who consumes content, but
does not necessarily create content, such as a person with a YouTube account that does not post
videos. Content creators are often also users and vice versa. While most content creators post
content casually, some people or groups are content creators for a living and thus have an additional
financial stake in platform content moderation decisions.
13. See generally Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, 951 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2020).
14. Id. at 995.
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nonprofit educational and media organization with a mission to ‘provide
conservative viewpoints and perspective on public issues that it believes are
often overlooked.’” 15 Prager University’s YouTube channel features videos
speaking out against the Black Lives Matter movement, 16 condemning the
anti-fascist political group Antifa, 17 and promoting content from conservative commentators like Ben Shapiro 18 and Candace Owens. 19
Prager University sued YouTube because YouTube placed some of
Prager University’s videos on Restricted Mode, which is a platform setting
that a user can choose to enable “that makes unavailable certain age-inappropriate content.” 20 Only about 1.5-2% of YouTube’s users enable restricted mode. 21 To determine which videos are limited by Restricted Mode,
YouTube uses algorithms to flag sensitive content such as material related
to drug use, sex, and violence and makes the flagged content unavailable to
those that enable Restricted Mode. 22 On Prager University’s channel specifically, YouTube restricted videos pertaining to subjects such as abortion and
“radical” Islam. 23
YouTube also disabled monetization—or “demonetized”—several of
Prager University’s videos, which is a process that removes advertisements
15. Id.
16. PragerU, ‘Black Lives Matter’ Is Not Helping Blacks, YOUTUBE (June 11, 2020),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zxLi-6RtmUQ [https://perma.cc/3RZH-9DXN].
17. PragerU, Antifa Declared A Terrorist Group, YOUTUBE (June 4, 2020), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dba5MOnxFxo [https://perma.cc/BB5X-8JBG].
18. PragerU, New Release This Monday, YOUTUBE (July 18, 2020), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=DuYvc-bPsgQ [https://perma.cc/GZ9T-X68K].
19. PragerU, The Candace Owens Show: Dinesh D’Souza, YOUTUBE (July 26, 2020),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X5_DBg31ZWU [https://perma.cc/7QHR-LCJ8].
20. Prager Univ., 951 F.3d at 996.
21. Id.
22. Johanna Wright, An Update on Restricted Mode, YOUTUBE OFFICIAL BLOG (Apr. 21,
2017), https://blog.youtube/news-and-events/an-update-on-restricted-mode/ [https://perma.cc
/7A58-JK4L].
23. Editorial: YouTube has censorship problems. The 1st Amendment Isn’t the Tool to Fix
Them, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2020, 3:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2020-02-27
/prager-university-youtube-lawsuit-rejected-9th-circuit [http://archive.vn/90KFA].
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from a videos that would otherwise allow Prager University to profit financially from the video’s views. 24 For a video to qualify for monetization, it
has to follow YouTube’s Community Guidelines, Terms of Service, copyright policies, and advertising policies. 25 YouTube’s advertising guidelines
are particularly elusive and restrict, among other things, content that is adult,
hateful, demeaning, shocking, controversial, or sensitive. 26
In its opinion in Prager University v. Google, the Ninth Circuit considered, among other things, whether YouTube infringed on Prager University’s
First Amendment right to free speech by restricting and demonetizing its
videos. 27 Ultimately, the court held that because YouTube is a private company, it does not have to provide free speech protections to its content creators and may censor content on its platform at its discretion. 28 The court
compared YouTube to a larger version of a private town bulletin board or
coffee shop where the public could share ideas. 29 Although YouTube is certainly a private entity that hosts speech, the problem with this comparison is
the extent to which YouTube offers a bigger platform. While a local coffee
shop or bulletin board might reach a few hundred visitors, YouTube touts
over 30 million visitors per day. 30
The magnitude of YouTube cannot be ignored when discussing its
place in society. YouTube, along with other major social networks like Facebook and Twitter, are massive platforms that, together, host billions of users. 31 In addition to providing entertainment, social media platforms provide
24. Prager Univ., 951 F.3d at 996.
25. YouTube Chanel Monetization Policies, YOUTUBE (2020), https://support.google.com
/youtube/answer/1311392?hl=en [https://perma.cc/ZH9Q-AM6P].
26. Advertiser-Friendly Content Guidelines, YOUTUBE, https://support.google.com
/youtube/answer/6162278 [https://perma.cc/AL5H-K8EK].
27. Prager Univ., 951 F.3d at 996.
28. Id. at 996–97.
29. Id. at 995.
30. Id.
31. J. Clement, Global Social Networks Ranked by Number of Users 2020, STATISTA (Aug.
21, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/272014/global-social-networks-ranked-by-numberof-users/ [https://perma.cc/R5NE-FXLV].
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Americans with information. In 2019, about 55% of American adults reported that they get their news from social media platforms such as Facebook
and Twitter either “often” or “sometimes”—up by 8% from the year before. 32 Politicians can now directly post content for their supporters in a way
that has never been done before; content creators can gain power by reaching
followers around the world; and users can isolate themselves into virtual
echo chambers by consuming only material that aligns with their views. 33
The ability of platforms to censor and promote content at their discretion
gives them unprecedented power to influence opinions and discourse.
Though many Americans consider the current methods of content moderation problematic, 34 there is currently no consensus on a solution. Legal
scholars have suggested various approaches such as treating companies as
individual “governors” of their platforms, 35 comparing major platforms to
nations with their own governments, 36 and modifying First Amendment doctrines to encompass regulation of platforms. 37
This Note argues that the most optimal approach to content moderation
focuses on the needs of content creators and users and involves both government and industry stakeholders. Part II explains content moderation and social media community standards in detail. Part III describes Section 230
protections and identifies two major issues with the current model of platform self-regulation: the constant threat of government interference and potential platform abandonment by users due to inconsistent and frustrating
32. Peter Suciu, More Americans Are Getting Their News from Social Media, FORBES (Oct.
11, 2019, 10:35 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/petersuciu/2019/10/11/more-americans-aregetting-their-news-from-social-media/#4ab1c2ad3e17 [https://perma.cc/323Z-KNGU].
33. Sam Sanders, Did Social Media Ruin Election 2016?, NPR (Nov. 8, 2016, 5:00 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2016/11/08/500686320/did-social-media-ruin-election-2016
[https://
perma.cc/4AES-E62E].
34. Suciu, supra note 32 (describing a 2019 report in which “[88%] of Americans. . . recognized that social media companies now have at least some control over the mix of the news that
people see each day [and] . . . 62% felt this was a problem”).
35. See generally Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes
Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1603 (2018).
36. See generally Anupam Chander, Facebookistan, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1807, 1815 (2012).
37. See generally Jonathan Peters, The “Sovereigns of Cyberspace” and State Action: The
First Amendment’s Application (or Lack Thereof) to Third-Party Platforms, 32 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 989 (2017).
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content moderation decisions. Part IV explores the reasons that First
Amendment free speech protections and government regulation are ineffective models for content moderation. Finally, this Note proposes a content
moderation model which features cooperation between government and industry leaders and encompasses the values of transparency, accountability,
and consistency.

II. OVERVIEW OF CONTENT MODERATION
Why is it that we do not encounter violent videos, graphic images, or
pornography more frequently on major social media platforms? The broad
answer to this question is because platforms engage in content moderation.
Content moderation is “the practice of flagging user-generated submissions
based on a set of guidelines in order to determine whether the submission
can be used or not in the related media.” 38 Section A of this Part explains
the reasons that content moderation is in the best interest of users and platforms. Section B then describes how content moderation consists of a combination of human moderators, algorithms, and user reports and discusses the
flaws inherent to each form.

A. Why Do Platforms Moderate Content?
Platforms have both legal and social authority to moderate user-generated content. Section 230(c)(2) of the CDA provides platforms with the express legal authority to moderate content. 39 Beyond legal authorization, society has come to expect that platforms will moderate and filter certain
content in order to protect users. 40 Platforms moderate content “out of a
sense of corporate responsibility” that is based in “American free speech and

38. What Is Content Moderation and Why Companies Need It, BRIDGED (Sept. 3, 2019),
https://bridged.co/blog/what-is-content-moderation-why-companies-need-it/
[https://perma.cc
/VE4J-UQWH].
39. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A)–(B) (2020) (stating that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of—(A) any action voluntarily taken in good
faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene,
lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not
such material is constitutionally protected; or (B) any action taken to enable or make available to
information content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material described
in paragraph (1).”).
40. See What Is Content Moderation and Why Companies Need It, supra note 38.
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democratic values.” 41 Perhaps most importantly, a platform’s economic viability depends on content moderation, especially of violent or obscene content. 42 Imagine, for example, a world in which Facebook posed a constant
risk of exposing users to videos of beheadings or pornographic images. Such
a Facebook would be unusable and unacceptable to many users, likely resulting in those users abandoning the platform for its lack of moderation.
Therefore, it is in a platform’s best interest to moderate content to ensure that
the website is friendly to as many users as possible.
To properly moderate content, platforms today use sets of community
guidelines to determine what sort of content is allowed on the platform. 43 If
a post violates a platform’s community guidelines, the platform can moderate the content in various ways, such as issuing a warning over, removing,
restricting, or demonetizing 44 the content. 45

B. What Does Content Moderation Look Like?
To conceptualize the monumental task of content moderation, it helps
to understand that there are 317,000 Facebook statuses, 46 347,000 tweets, 47

41. Klonick, supra note 35, at 1625–26.
42. Id. at 1625.
43. See id. at 1631.
44. Demonetization is the process of disabling content’s ability to generate revenue through
advertising income. James Johnson, How to Survive YouTube Demonetization and Continue Making Money from Your Channel, USCREEN (Aug. 8, 2019), https://www.uscreen.tv/blog/how-to-survive-youtube-demonetization/ [https://perma.cc/YX88-8NXK].
45. See generally Jillian C. York & Corynne McSherry, Content Moderation Is Broken. Let
Us Count the Ways., ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 29, 2019), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019
/04/content-moderation-broken-let-us-count-ways [https://perma.cc/7P6E-9ARB]; Christine
Fisher, YouTube Will Temporarily Increase Automated Content Moderation, ENGADGET (Mar. 16,
2020), https://www.engadget.com/2020-03-16-youtube-automated-content-moderation-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/2JKT-RMW9].
46. Facebook by the Numbers: Stats, Demographics and Fun Facts, OMNICORE (Apr. 22,
2020), https://www.omnicoreagency.com/facebook-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/EU89-A2FN].
47. Twitter by the Numbers: Stats, Demographics and Fun Facts, OMNICORE (Feb. 10,
2020), https://www.omnicoreagency.com/twitter-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/P3AE-SQHU].
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and 500 hours of YouTube video footage 48 posted every single minute. Social media platforms use a combination of human moderators, automated algorithms, and user reports to filter through the massive amount of content
contained on their platforms. 49
The need to moderate this material started with the rise of websites that
featured large amounts of user-generated content, some of which could be
inappropriate or undesirable for users to encounter. 50 The very first form of
platform content moderation was performed by human employees. 51 Human
content moderators still work in call center-like hubs around the world and
review content reported by users. 52 Although these employees have handbooks—some up to 80 pages long 53—that dictate what sort of content to remove, content moderation is an inevitably subjective and inconsistent art.
Moderators can and do make exceptions for certain content based on its context. 54 For example, a platform could have a rule banning derogatory language, which may include the N-word. However, banning use of the N-word
outright “could be completely insensitive to the African American community in the United States,” who may use the N-word in a non-derogatory
manner. 55 Before making a content moderation decision, a content moderator would have to take into account more subjective factors such as who used
the N-word and the context in which it was used. The process becomes
thorny when content moderators, who often work in traumatic and mentally
48. YouTube by the Numbers: Stats, Demographics and Fun Facts, OMNICORE (Feb. 10,
2020), https://www.omnicoreagency.com/youtube-statistics/ [https://perma.cc/B67L-CRUL].
49. What Is Content Moderation and Why Companies Need It, supra note 38.
50. Minna Ruckenstein & Linda Lisa Maria Turunen, Re-humanizing the Platform: Content
Moderators and the Logic of Care, 22.6 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 1026, https://journals.sagepub.com
/doi/full/10.1177/1461444819875990# [https://perma.cc/JPP2-MD22].
51. York & McSherry, supra note 45.
52. Casey Newton, The Trauma Floor: The Secret Lives of Facebook Moderators in America, VERGE (Feb. 25, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/2/25/18229714/cognizant-facebook-content-moderator-interviews-trauma-working-conditions-arizona
[https://archive.is/Qb9vb].
53. Klonick, supra note 35, at 1634.
54. Id. at 1634–35.
55. Id. at 1634.
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draining environments, 56 are put in the position of making snap decisions
about sensitive content. Such decisions consistently invite individual biases
regarding race, gender, and sexual orientation to play a role in content moderation decisions. 57
Because of the large amount of content uploaded to platforms daily,
human teams are not sufficient to moderate content on their own. Though it
is unclear exactly what percentage of content is moderated by algorithms as
opposed to humans, platforms want algorithms to play an increasingly prominent role in content moderation. 58 An example of when an algorithm is used
in content moderation is in the period of time between when a video is uploaded and when it is posted. 59 During this period, algorithms scan the uploaded content against digital libraries and search for prohibited material
such as graphic imagery or copyrighted matter. 60 However, algorithms cannot exercise the same level of nuanced discretion as human moderators
which can result in “an even more secretive process in which false positives
may never see the light of day.” 61 For example, algorithms can detect nudity
with a high rate of accuracy, but may have trouble discerning between

56. Human content moderators spend their shifts reviewing “hate speech, . . . violent attacks, [and] graphic pornography.” Because of the nature of the work, some employees have reported developing severe mental health issues. Newton, supra note 52.
57. Daisy Soderberg-Rivkin, When It Comes to Content Moderation, We’ve Been Focusing
on the Wrong Type of Bias, MORNING CONSULT (Dec. 5, 2019 5:00 AM), https://morningconsult.com/opinions/when-it-comes-to-content-moderation-weve-been-focusing-on-the-wrong-typeof-bias/ [https://perma.cc/D9J2-SLT2] (giving several examples of content moderation decisions
motivated by bias, including Facebook’s quick removal of a post about the fragility of white men
as hate speech and YouTube’s restricting of LGBTQ+-themed videos at a high rate).
58. See, e.g., Klonick, supra note 35, at 1636; Shannon Bond, Facebook, YouTube Warn of
More Mistakes as Machines Replace Moderators, NPR (Mar. 31, 2020, 5:06 AM), https://
www.npr.org/2020/03/31/820174744/facebook-youtube-warn-of-more-mistakes-as-machines-replace-moderators [https://perma.cc/ZDF4-KQ6W] (explaining that major platforms sent many human content moderators home due to the COVID-19 pandemic and plan to rely more heavily on
automated content moderation methods in the future).
59. Klonick, supra note 35, at 1636.
60. Id. at 1637.
61. York & McSherry, supra note 45.
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“Renaissance art . . . and banned content such as sexual activity.” 62 The
struggle of algorithms to recognize nuance has led to the removal of otherwise appropriate content, including YouTube news coverage of extremist attacks that algorithms failed to distinguish from the extremist attacks themselves. 63
Finally, a platform’s users also help with the content moderation process. 64 Platforms generally have reporting tools that individual users can use
to flag content that they believe should not be on the platform. 65 The flagged
content is then reviewed by moderators who decide whether or not to remove
the content. 66 However, platform users often flag content inappropriately. 67
Most flagged content does not violate community standards but instead “often reflect[s] . . . conflicts or disagreements of opinion.” 68 The reporting
process is also administered unevenly because it can result in flagging more
visible or disliked people at a higher rate, even if similar content posted others with lower profiles is permitted. 69
No single method of content moderation is sufficient on its own. Ultimately, whether content moderation remains controlled by platforms, becomes regulated by the government, or is implemented by another method,
the combination of human content moderators, algorithms, and user reports
will inevitably play a role in ensuring that websites remain safe and usable
for users.

62. Ben Dickson, Human Help Wanted: Why AI Is Terrible at Content Moderation, PC
MAG. (July 10, 2019), https://www.pcmag.com/opinions/human-help-wanted-why-ai-is-terribleat-content-moderation [https://perma.cc/7VFF-EA8K].
63. Id.
64. What Is Content Moderation and Why Companies Need It, supra note 38.
65. Id.
66. Newton, supra note 52.
67. See Klonick, supra note 35, at 1638.
68. Id.
69. York & McSherry, supra note 45.
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III. THE PROBLEM WITH PLATFORM SELF-REGULATION
Section 230 largely allows platforms to moderate user-generated content at their discretion. 70 However, the autonomy that platforms enjoy in this
realm is under threat. In 2020, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) declared
that “the time is ripe” to amend Section 230. 71 Congress heeded the call and
proposed several bills that seek to roll back Section 230 protections. 72 In
addition to legal threats, creators and users have grown increasingly frustrated with community guidelines that are “opaque” and change frequently,
creating uncertainty as to whether they are violating platform standards. 73
Section A of this Part details Section 230’s protections and limitations in the
content moderation arena. Section B discusses current government attempts
to limit Section 230 protections. Finally, Section C explains how the growing frustration from creators and users regarding platform content moderation decisions could eventually lead to the decline or abandonment of platforms. The increasing attempts at government regulation, combined with
creator and user frustration at platform decisions, makes total content moderation autonomy an increasingly unlikely model for the future.

A. How Does Section 230 Protect Platforms?
Section 230 provides platforms with two protections that allow them to
regulate user-generated content without the fear of civil liability.
First, Section 230(c)(1) sets forth that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content provider.” 74 This

70. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2018) (providing that platforms shall not be treated as publishers
of user-generated content); 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (2018) (protecting platforms from civil liability
for steps taken to moderate most content).
71. Section 230—Nurturing Innovation or Fostering Unaccountability?, U.S. DEPT. JUST.
(June 2020), https://www.justice.gov/file/1286331/download [https://perma.cc/T9AK-PMFX].
72. See, e.g., S. 3983, 116th Cong. (2020); H.R. 4027, 116th Cong. (2020).
73. Klonick, supra note 35, at 1630. Klonick discusses the evolution of content moderation. In the early days of social media, platforms had small, vague lists of things that were not
allowed, and much of the moderation was based on “gut feelings.” Over time, major platforms
developed large, international teams that use more robust sets of guidelines to moderate content.
74. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
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provision applies to any “interactive computer service,” 75 such as a social
media platform 76 or the comment section of a newspaper’s website. 77 The
protection under Section 230(c)(1) means that platforms are not treated as
the publishers of user-generated content. 78 Therefore, if a YouTube creator
posts a defamatory video, YouTube will not be liable for defamation because
the creator, not YouTube, is considered the publisher of the content. 79
Second, Section 230(c)(2) sets forth that providers of interactive computer services will not face civil liability for “any action voluntarily taken in
good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or
user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent,
harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.” 80 This provision provides social media platforms
with broad authority to set and enforce their own content moderation rules. 81
Section 230(c)(1) and Section 230(c)(2) thus work together to provide platforms with the freedom to set their own community guidelines, to shield
them from civil liability for most actions taken to moderate content, and to
shield them from liability for content posted by their users.

75. An interactive computer service is “any information service, system, or access software
provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server . . .”. 47
U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (2018).
76. See Fed. Agency of News LLC v. Facebook, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 3d 1295, 1305 (N.D.
Cal. 2019) (asserting that Facebook clearly meets the definition of an interactive computer service);
Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that AOL is not liable for
tortious content posted by a user because AOL is an interactive computer service and not the publisher of the material).
77. Makena Kelly, Big Tech’s Liability Shield Under Fire Yet Again from Republicans,
VERGE (July 28, 2019, 1:00 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/7/28/8933871/big-techs-liability-shield-under-fire-yet-again-from-republicans [http://archive.today/h3rge].
78. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (explaining that “[Section 230] precludes courts from entertaining claims that would place a computer service provider in a publisher’s role.”).
79. Id.
80. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A).
81. Russell Brandom, Senate Republicans Want to Make It Easier to Sue Tech Companies
for Bias, VERGE (June 17, 2020, 9:46 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/6/17/21294032/section-230-hawley-rubio-conservative-bias-lawsuit-good-faith [http://archive.today/QmhYc].
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The protections under Section 230(c), however, are not absolute. Section 230(e) sets forth limitations to Section 230(c). 82 Section 230(e) explains
that interactive computer services could face liability under criminal law,
intellectual property law, state law, communications privacy law, and sex
trafficking law for their content moderation decisions. 83
The most controversial Section 230(e) exception to date is the provision against sex trafficking, 84 which Congress passed as a package in 2018
through the Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act
(“FOSTA”) 85 and Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act (“SESTA”). 86 The
House bill clarified that “[Section 230(c)] does not prohibit the enforcement
against providers and users of interactive computer services of Federal and
State criminal and civil law relating to sexual exploitation of children or sex
trafficking . . . .” 87 It also amended the federal criminal code to define illegal
“participation in a venture” that engages in sex trafficking as “knowingly
assisting, supporting, or facilitating [a sex trafficking violation].” 88 SESTA
largely echoed FOSTA and set forth that “[Section 230(c)(2)] shall not be
construed to impair or limit . . . any claim in a civil action brought under
[federal sex trafficking law] . . . or . . . any charge in a criminal prosecution
brought under State law if the conduct underlying the charge constitutes a

82. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(e).
83. Id.
84. “Nothing in this section (other than subsection (c)(2)(A)) shall be construed to impair
or limit—(A) any claim in a civil action brought under section 1595 of Title 18, if the conduct
underlying the claim constitutes a violation of section 1591 of that title; (B) any charge in a criminal
prosecution brought under State law if the conduct underlying the charge would constitute a violation of section 1591 of Title 18; or (C) any charge in a criminal prosecution brought under State
law if the conduct underlying the charge would constitute a violation of section 2421A of Title 18,
and promotion or facilitation of prostitution is illegal in the jurisdiction where the defendant’s promotion or facilitation of prostitution was targeted.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5).
85. Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017, Pub. L. No.
115-164, 132 Stat. 1253 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2421A and 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2018)).
86. S. 1693, 115th Cong. (2017).
87. H.R. 1865, 115th Cong. (2017).
88. H.R. 1865, 115th Cong. § 5 (2017).
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violation of [federal sex trafficking law].” 89 Ultimately, FOSTA and SESTA
worked together to create an exception under Section 230(e) for sex trafficking, 90 but did little to specify exactly what terms such as “facilitating” sex
trafficking meant.
FOSTA-SESTA was criticized by groups such as the American Civil
Liberties Union (“ACLU”) and the Sex Workers Outreach Project
(“SWOP”) as a “disguised internet censorship bill” intended to weaken Section 230 protections and control the content allowed by interactive service
providers. 91 The seemingly innocuous goal of preventing sex trafficking was
extremely consequential for platforms, users, and creators. To avoid potential liability created by FOSTA-SESTA, many platforms created stricter
community guidelines around any sexual or sex-adjacent content. 92 The
stricter enforcement by platforms resulted in unfortunate consequences, such
as encouraging consensual online sex workers off of the internet and to the
street 93 and resulting in the deletion of content that was posted to help victims
of sex trafficking. 94

89. S. 1693, 115th Cong. § 3 (2017).
90. See supra note 84.
91. SWOP-USA Stands in Opposition of Disguised Internet Censorship Bill SESTA, S.
1963, SWOP-USA (Aug. 11, 2017), https://swopusa.org/blog/2017/08/11/call-to-actionpress-release-swop-usa-stands-in-direct-opposition-of-disguised-internet-censorship-bill-sesta-s-1963call-your-state-representatives-and-tell-them-to-fight/ [https://perma.cc/T4TX-CRUK].
92. Anthony Cuthbertson, Tumblr Porn Ban: One-Fifth of Users Have Deserted Site Since
It Removed Adult Content, INDEPENDENT (Mar. 11, 2019, 4:06 PM), https://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/tumblr-porn-ban-nsfw-verizon-yahoo-adult-contenta8817546.html [https://perma.cc/UT8W-V4YU].
93. Mike Masnick, The Human Cost of FOSTA, TECHDIRT (May 7, 2019, 9:39 AM), https://
www.techdirt.com/articles/20190503/13180842135/human-cost-fosta.shtml
[https://perma.cc
/B78E-LAUP].
94. Id.
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B. Government Attempts to Regulate Section 230
Today, Section 230 protections for social media platforms face threats
from both Congress and executive branch. 95 Subsections (1) and (2) focus
on two recent government efforts to scale back Section 230 protections for
social media platforms. The first is former President Trump’s executive order 96 directing the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) to draft
regulations that clarify, among other things, when interactive computer services can be held liable for content moderation decisions not taken in good
faith. 97 The second is a bipartisan bill called the Eliminating Abusive and
Rampant Neglect of Interactive Technologies Act of 2020 (“EARN IT Act”),
which seeks to expand Section 230(e)’s to include an exception for violations
of “child sexual exploitation law.” 98

1. President Trump’s “Executive Order on Preventing Online
Censorship”
President Trump’s May 26, 2020 tweet stating that the use of mail-in
ballots for the 2020 presidential election would lead to widespread voter
fraud 99 catapulted the discussion about the future of Section 230 into public
discourse. In response to the tweet, Twitter added a link below the tweet
titled: “Get the facts about mail-in ballots” and characterized President
Trump’s claims as “unsubstantiated.” 100 Upset at Twitter’s response,
95. Casey Newton, Everything You Need to Know About Section 230, VERGE (May 28,
2020, 3:46 PM), https://www.theverge.com/21273768/section-230-explained-internet-speech-lawdefinition-guide-free-moderation [https://archive.is/Pt3uG].
96. Exec. Order No. 13925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34079, § 8(a)(i) (June 2, 2020).
97. Section 230(c)(2)(A) protects platforms from civil liability for “any action voluntarily
taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers
to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable,
whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.” (emphasis added); 47 U.S.C. §
230(c)(2)(A) (2018). In his executive order, President Trump asks the FCC to clarify when content
moderation decisions could be considered not “in good faith.”
98. EARN IT Act of 2020, S. 3398, 116th Cong. (2020).
99. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 26, 2020, 5:17 AM), https://
twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1265255835124539392 [https://archive.is/XJ8eS].
100. Id.; Trump Makes Unsubstantiated Claim That Mail-In Ballots Will Lead to Voter
Fraud, supra note 4.
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President Trump issued an executive order titled “Executive Order on Preventing Online Censorship.” 101
The executive order asserts that it is “un-American” and “dangerous”
to allow a small number of companies to “pick the speech that Americans
may access and convey on the internet.” 102 It then directs the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) to draft regulations that: (1) “clarify and
determine the circumstances under which a provider of an interactive computer service that restricts access to content in a manner not specifically protected by [Section 230(c)(2)(A)] may also not be able to claim protection
under [Section 230(c)(1);]” (2) specify when a company’s conduct could violate Section 230’s “good faith” provision; and (3) propose any other regulation that “may be appropriate to expand [this] policy.” 103 The executive
order also calls for an investigation of whether social media companies engage in discrimination based on the political viewpoint of a content creator. 104
Although the President does not have the authority to change an existing law by issuing an executive order, 105 the order could prove impactful in
one of two ways. First, courts have determined that where a law is unclear,
federal agencies may step in and “fill the gap.” 106 A statute may provide this
gap filling authority either explicitly through Congress or may provide implicit authorization by not defining key terms. 107 When the relevant federal

101. Exec. Order No. 13925, 85 Fed. Reg. at 34079.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 34081.
104. Id. at 34081–82.
105. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. et al. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
106. E.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984)
(stating that “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for
the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute”
which can be either explicit or implicit); Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Geodis Logistics, LLC, No. 1:19CV-03341-JPB, 2020 WL 4938362, at *3 (N.D. Ga. July 7, 2020) (explaining that “because the
statute is silent as to who is liable for demurrage, the [Surface Transformation Board] had the authority to ‘fill the gap’ and issue a regulation regarding the issue”).
107. S.F. Baykeeper v. Cargill Salt Div., 481 F.3d 700, 704 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining that
“[b]y not defining further the meaning of ‘waters of the United States,’ Congress implicitly
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agency interprets a statue, “the court should defer to the agency’s interpretation as long as it is reasonable.” 108 Thus with regards to Section 230, the
FCC may be able to formulate guidelines on what sort of content moderation
decisions do and do not constitute “good faith” pursuant to Section
230(c)(2). 109 Second, the executive order signaled the Trump administration’s approval for Congress to amend Section 230, an initiative that is seemingly also supported by President Joe Biden’s administration. 110 Congress
could heed the call given that there are already active bills intended to roll
back Section 230 protections. One such bill would require interactive computer services to undertake a duty of good faith to keep their Section 230
protections and would impose monetary penalties for breach. 111 Another bill
seeks to restrict an interactive computer service’s ability to moderate content
the company finds “objectionable.” 112 Even the DOJ has proposed that “the
time is ripe” to amend Section 230 altogether. 113 Thus, even though President Trump’s executive order does not have the force of law, the executive
order, combined with President Biden’s stance on Section 230 nonetheless
signals bipartisan approval of the initiatives to roll back Section 230 protections.
delegated policy-making authority to the EPA and the Corps, the agencies charged with the CWA’s
administration.”).
108. Chao v. Symms Fruit Ranch, Inc., 242 F.3d 894, 897 (9th Cir. 2001).
109. See supra note 97. Section 230(c)(2)(A) does not currently specify exactly what sort
of conduct constitutes good faith.
110. Joseph Fawbush, After Executive Order Condemning Online Censorship, Should Social Media Companies Fear Liability?, FINDLAW (June 1, 2020, 2:30 PM), https://
blogs.findlaw.com/technologist/2020/06/after-executive-order-condemning-online-censorshipshould-social-media-companies-fear-liability.html?DCMP=pro_special:nwl:z:2020june:feature
[https://perma.cc/CEU8-HM3E]. President Biden has stated that he thinks Section 230 should be
revoked and his current nominee for Secretary of Commerce, Gina Raimondo, believes that Section
230 should be reformed. Of note, the Biden administration, has not taken action in that direction
as of the publication of this Note. Makena Kelly, Biden’s Commerce Nominee Backs Changes to
Section
230,
VERGE
(Jan.
26,
2021,
1:40
PM),
https://www.theverge.com/2021/1/26/22250746/biden-gina-raimondo-commerce-secretary-section-230 [https://archive.is/tCKsd].
111. S. 3983, 116th Cong. (2020); Brandom, supra note 81.
112. H.R. 4027, 116th Cong. (2019); Kelly, supra note 77.
113. Section 230—Nurturing Innovation or Fostering Unaccountability, supra note 71.

MIKAELYAN_MACROS_V4.5 (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

REIMAGINING CONTENT MODERATION

3/2/2021 11:28 PM

197

2. EARN IT Act
The EARN IT Act is perhaps the biggest threat to Section 230 protections today. The bipartisan bill introduced by Senators Lindsey Graham and
Richard Blumenthal seeks to expand Section 230(e) by amending it to include an exception for violations of federal and state “child sexual exploitation law.” 114 In the same way that FOSTA-SESTA added a sex trafficking
exception to Section 230(e), the EARN IT Act seeks to add an exception for
child sexual exploitation law. Ultimately, the EARN It Act would set forth
that interactive service providers could be held liable for civil and criminal
prosecution for the “advertisement, promotion, presentation, distribution, or
solicitation of child sexual abuse material.” 115
The EARN IT Act would also create a National Commission on Online
Child Sexual Exploitation Prevention (“Commission”) to construct a set of
“recommended best practices that providers of interactive computer services
may choose to implement to prevent, reduce, and respond to the online sexual exploitation of children, including the enticement, grooming, sex trafficking, and sexual abuse of children and the proliferation of online child
sexual abuse material.” 116 The Commission would consist of sixteen members 117 comprised of law enforcement, online child crime experts or survivors, and technology experts. 118 The original version of the bill created a
safe harbor from liability for interactive computer services that followed the
114. “Section 230(e) of the Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. 230(e) is amended by
adding at the end the following: ‘(6) NO EFFECT ON CHILD SEXUAL EXPLOITATION
LAW.—Nothing in this section (other than subsection (c)(2)(A)) shall be construed to impair or
limit— ‘(A) any claim in a civil action brought against a provider of an interactive computer service
under section 2255 of title 18, United States Code, if the conduct underlying the claim constitutes
a violation of section 2252 or section 2252A of that title; ’(B) any charge in a criminal prosecution
brought against a provider of an interactive computer service under State law regarding the advertisement, promotion, presentation, distribution, or solicitation of child sexual abuse material, as
defined in section 2256(8) of title 18, United States Code; or ’(C) any claim in a civil action brought
against a provider of an interactive computer service under State law regarding the advertisement,
promotion, presentation, distribution, or solicitation of child sexual abuse material, as defined in
section 2256(8) of title 18, United States Code.” EARN IT Act of 2020, S. 3398, 116th Cong.
(2020).
115. Id. § 5(B).
116. Id. § 3.
117. Id. § 3(c)(1)(A).
118. Id. § 3(c)(2).
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Commission’s recommendations. 119 The safe harbor provision created undue pressure for interactive computer services to follow their recommendations in order to avoid liability. 120 Although the bill has been amended to
remove the safe harbor provision, many still worry that platforms will inevitably face pressure to follow the Commission’s recommendations or risk
liability for child sexual exploitation. 121
Critics of the bill are concerned that if the EARN IT Act passes, platforms will have to take restrictive content moderation steps to comply with
potentially conflicting and expansive child exploitation laws in all fifty
states, as they did with FOSTA-SESTA. 122 The passage of the EARN IT
Act will similarly result in stricter rules that will “force platforms to overcensor speech out of an abundance of caution due to fear of endless litigation.” 123
The DOJ and Congress are eager to play a bigger role in content moderation. 124 Instead of amending Section 230(c) in its entirety, Congress has
proposed bills to slowly chip away at its protections. 125 Like FOSTASESTA before it, the EARN IT Act seeks to add yet another exception to
Section 230(e), giving Congress more power over platform content moderation. The EARN IT Act is thus an attempt by Congress to heed the DOJ’s
call that “the time is ripe” to roll back Section 230 protections. 126
119. Id. § 6(a)(6)(B).
120. Michael S. Horikawa & Jon Schreiber, EARN IT Act Amendments Could Shift Section
230 Protection from DOJ Guideline Compliance to Post Hoc Enforcement Regime, JD SUPRA:
PILLSBURY (Aug. 3, 2020), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/earn-it-act-amendments-couldshift-48919/ [https://perma.cc/NKD5-3Z4D].
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Corey Silverstein, The EARN IT Act: Are You Paying Attention Yet?, XBIZ (Aug. 23,
2020),
https://www.xbiz.com/features/253832/the-earn-it-act-are-you-paying-attention-yet
[https://perma.cc/VD39-CJQD]; Horikawa & Schreiber, supra note 120.
124. Department of Justice’s Review of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of
1996, supra note 64.
125. E.g., EARN IT Act of 2020, S. 3398, 116th Cong. (2020); H.R. 4027, 116th Cong.
(2019).
126. Section 230—Nurturing Innovation or Fostering Unaccountability, supra note 71.
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C. Creator and User Frustration with Content Regulation Methods
The possibility of government intervention in content moderation is not
the only threat to platforms. Another is the threat of usage decline by increasingly confused, frustrated, and distrustful creators and users. 127 Subsections (1) and (2) below focus on two areas of platform abandonment: (1)
a brief overview of the reasons behind previous platform abandonment and
(2) what platform abandonment could mean for major social media platforms
today.

1. A History of Platform Abandonment
It is difficult to imagine a world where Facebook, Twitter, and
YouTube do not play a role in everyday life. In 2010, it must have been
equally difficult to imagine a world without renting a weekend movie from
Blockbuster. Ten years prior, it would be similarly difficult to imagine a
world without malls for back-to-school shopping. And yet, both Blockbuster 128 and malls, 129 once staples of daily life, today seem like relics of a
different era. The idea that today’s social media platforms will last forever
is therefore misguided, despite their explosive growth in the 21st century. 130
The first notable instance of a fallen powerhouse in the social media
realm was the fall of MySpace in the late 2000s. MySpace, which at one
point touted more daily visitors than Google, 131 declined sharply in the late

127. Audrey Schomer, The Content Moderation Report: Social platforms Are Facing A
Massive Content Crisis—Here’s Why We’re Thinking Regulation is Coming and What it Will Look
Like, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 14, 2019, 7:03 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/content-moderation-report-2019-11 [https://perma.cc/Q3RU-SM7S].
128. Greg Satell, A Look Back At Why Blockbuster Really Failed and Why It Didn’t Have
To, FORBES (Sept. 5, 2014, 11:38 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/gregsatell/2014/09/05/alook-back-at-why-blockbuster-really-failed-and-why-it-didnt-have-to/#27fc20961d64
[https://
perma.cc/E745-E9AJ].
129. Mary Hanbury, 50 Haunting Photos of Abandoned Shopping Malls Across America,
BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 8, 2019, 3:49 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/american-retail-apocalypse-in-photos-2018-1 [https://perma.cc/BU5E-J7KQ].
130. Esteban Ortiz-Ospina, The Rise of Social Media, OUR WORLD IN DATA (Sept. 18,
2019), https://ourworldindata.org/rise-of-social-media [https://perma.cc/T3UE-J7VP].
131. Id.
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2000s. 132 The once simple platform became clunky, ad-littered, and difficult
to use. 133 The fall of MySpace demonstrated that a burdensome user experience can be fatal even to the largest and most popular platform. 134
Content moderation decisions are also decisions in user experience. 135
This was apparent with the fall of the social networking and blogging platform Tumblr. In an attempt to comply with FOSTA-SESTA in 2018, Tumblr created an algorithm to find and delete adult content. 136 The algorithm
targeted not only illegal content, but legal content that fell under “photos,
videos, or GIFs that show real-life human genitals or female-presenting nipples, and any content . . . that depict sex acts.” 137 Before implementation of
the algorithm, Tumblr featured a large base of consensual sex workers, blogs
that posted sexual imagery, and blogs that discussed sexual health and
safety. 138 Once the stricter guidelines were implemented and blogs featuring
sexual content were removed, Tumblr lost a fifth of its users. 139

132. Matthew Garrahan, The Rise and Fall of MySpace, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2009), https://
www.ft.com/content/fd9ffd9c-dee5-11de-adff-00144feab49a [http://archive.today/tooaF].
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See generally Content Moderation and the User Experience, HAA SITES AT THE
UNIV. OF PITT. (Mar. 31, 2020), https://sites.haa.pitt.edu/digitalcriticalmethods/2020/03/31/content-moderation-and-the-user-experience/ [https://perma.cc/7H7T-WVC6].
136. What Tumblr’s Ban on ‘Adult Content’ Actually Did, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/tossedout/tumblr-ban-adult-content [https://perma.cc/VHS2-RUG5].
137. Cuthbertson, supra note 92.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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2. Potential Platform Abandonment Today
Today, as Facebook 140 and Twitter 141 lose users for the first time and
YouTube 142 creators report less income from ads, decisions on how to moderate content could be highly impactful for the major social media platforms.
On YouTube, creators frequently criticize the platform’s constantly changing and confusing content-moderation standards. The standards force creators to guess whether their content will remain on the website, lose monetization, or remain untouched. 143
Conservative-leaning content creators like Prager University are not
the only ones claiming that the platform is biased against their content. 144
LGBTQ+ content creators also claim that their videos are demonetized or
restricted just for having LGBTQ+-related words in the titles. 145 Even creators that make videos about sensitive topics are targeted. For example,
YouTube creator Phillip DeFranco posted a video covering the police killing
of George Floyd separately from his usual daily upload for fear that the sensitive content would subject the entire video to demonetization or

140. Abrar Al-Heeti, Facebook Lost 15 Million US Users in the Past Two Years, Report
Says, CNET (Mar. 6, 2019, 1:58 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/facebook-lost-15-million-ususers-in-the-past-two-years-report-says/ [https://perma.cc/L8X7-4JSU].
141. Kalev Leetaru, A Fading Twitter Changes Its User Metrics Once Again, FORBES (Apr.
23, 2019, 10:02 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kalevleetaru/2019/04/23/a-fading-twitterchanges-its-user-metrics-once-again/#42c25b0c7a31 [https://perma.cc/FX6Q-TWVQ].
142. Geoff Weiss, A Lot of YouTube Creators Just Disclosed Their Declining AdSense
Rates Amid the Coronavirus Pandemic, TUBEFILTER (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.tubefilter.com
/2020/04/16/creators-disclose-declining-adsense-rates-coronavirus/
[https://perma.cc/PWP2UARV].
143. Louise Matsakis, YouTube Doesn’t Know Where Its Own Line Is, WIRED (Mar. 2,
2018, 11:41 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/youtube-content-moderation-inconsistent/
[https://perma.cc/2YDT-5Z3R].
144. Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, 951 F.3d 991, 999 (9th Cir. 2020).
145. Aja Romano, A Group of YouTubers is Trying to Prove the Site Systematically Demonetizes Queer Content, VOX (Oct. 10, 2019, 9:40 AM), https://www.vox.com/culture/2019/10
/10/20893258/youtube-lgbtq-censorship-demonetization-nerd-city-algorithm-report
[https://archive.is/qXiQl] (describing a study of LGBTQ+-related video titles that were deemed “fit for monetization” found that 33 out of the 100 videos tested were demonetized).
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restriction. 146 The separate video discussing George Floyd was demonetized. 147 Similarly, creator Jessica Kent, who makes educational videos
about her former incarceration and drug addiction, has started to bleep out
words related to drug use in her videos, despite the fact that her content is
educational and meant to deter viewers from drug use and illegal activity.148
Though these may seem like small annoyances, a consistent stream of small
annoyances could deter content creators from discussing and addressing sensitive topics on their channels. Further, YouTube’s inconsistent and vague
monetization and restriction requirements make it so that content creators
often make guesses at what it would take to continue to make a living off of
their content. Even with the measures taken to prevent demonetization, creators still remain unclear as to whether the methods will work. This sort of
confusion is slowly driving some content creators away from YouTube. 149
As with MySpace and Tumblr, if content creators leave YouTube, they are
likely to take their fans to new platforms along with them.
Similarly, Twitter’s content moderation decisions have also pushed
some creators and users to other platforms. For example, after Twitter placed
the content warning on President Trump’s tweet about mail-in ballots, many
of his ardent supporters abandoned Twitter for Parler, a Twitter-like platform
which claims to engage in minimal content regulation only driven by “the
spirit of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.” 150 Parler,
which has quickly grown to almost twelve million users, 151 rapidly turned
146. Phillip DeFranco, Disgusting! We Need To Talk About What Happened To George
Floyd . . . What We Know & What Happens Next, YOUTUBE (May 27, 2020), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=JGecrIMn_Ds [https://perma.cc/PH5Q-6HXZ].
147. Id.
148. Jessica Kent, Top Ten Things I Used to Do, YOUTUBE (July 27, 2020), https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=Z7Uk-siZL6o [https://perma.cc/TMG2-J3EK] (explaining, in a video
about the negative behaviors she exhibited during her drug addiction, that she must bleep out names
of certain drugs because “YouTube is kicking [her] ass” by demonetizing videos that discuss drug
use).
149. Julia Alexander, YouTubers Look to New Platforms After Viewer Suppression, Demonetization Issues, POLYGON (Apr. 17, 2018, 6:30 PM), https://www.polygon.com/2018/4/17
/17246948/defranco-patreon-casey-neistat-youtube-ceo-demonetized [https://archive.is/kw5vs].
150. Parler Community Guidelines, PARLER (Aug. 21, 2020), https://legal.parler.com/documents/guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/T3T3-SDYX].
151. In early 2021, after the pro-Trump riot at the United States Capitol, President Trump
was banned from Twitter and Parler’s user base grew from about three million to twelve million.
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into a conservative echo chamber. Upon joining the platform, users are immediately prompted to follow Breitbart, the Daily Caller, and Eric Trump—
all avid supporters of Parler. 152 Although Parler’s user base of 12 million
pales in comparison to Twitter’s 159 million active users, 153 it would be a
mistake for today’s social media giants to ignore the threat of emerging platforms to their success. Large platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and
YouTube should be alarmed by statistics showing that 80% of Americans
distrust their content moderation methodologies 154 because that distrust
chips away at their content moderation autonomy and fuels additional minimization of Section 230 protections.

IV. WHAT IS THE SOLUTION?
If full platform self-governance is unlikely to remain, what is the alternative? Part IV analyzes several alternative methods to regulate content
moderation. Section A explains why the First Amendment’s free speech
protections could not prevent platforms from censoring speech. Section B
describes how low technological literacy and political self-interest are likely
to result in draconian content moderation decisions if the task is entirely left
to the government. Finally, Section C poses a solution based on governmentindustry cooperation with a focus on transparency, consistency, and accountability.

After being taken offline by Amazon’s cloud provider, Parler sued Amazon, but the court denied
Parler’s request to force Amazon to allow it back online. As of the publication of this Note, Parler
is back online using an independent server. Rachel Lerman & Natasha Tiku, Parler is Offline, but
Violent Posts Scraped by Hackers Will Haunt Users, WASH. POST (Jan. 12, 2021, 12:04 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/01/12/parler-data-downloaded/
[https://perma.cc/Q5X9-LV6F]. Igor Bonifacic, Parler Is Back Online After Amazon Kicked It Off
the Internet, YAHOO FINANCE (Feb. 15, 2021), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/parler-backonline-173810043.html [https://perma.cc/29HT-JXDJ].
152. Mark Sullivan, I Joined Parler, The Right-Wing Echo Chamber’s New Favorite AltTwitter, FAST COMPANY (June 27, 2020), https://www.fastcompany.com/90522049/i-joinedparler-the-right-wing-echo-chambers-new-favorite-alt-twitter [https://perma.cc/6XFB-UYMZ].
153. Twitter by the Numbers: Stats, Demographics and Fun Facts, supra note 47.
154. Sarah Brennan, 80% of Americans Distrust Tech Companies’ Content Moderation, IT
PRO (June 17, 2020), https://www.itpro.com/marketing-comms/social-media/356109/80-of-americans-trust-tech-companies-content-moderation [https://perma.cc/79XU-LN2G].
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A. The First Amendment Does Not Protect the Public’s Ability to
Say Anything Online
The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States says that
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” 155 The
First Amendment, especially the right to free speech, is perhaps the most
cherished right in the United States. 156 For Americans, free speech is more
than a right—it is a value, 157 a “central tenet of our American way of life,” 158
and something that feels almost dystopian when denied. Because of this,
Americans often have visceral reactions when they are not able to say the
things they want to say, evoking their right to free speech “every time [someone is] banned from Twitter.” 159 Americans value the right to free speech
so much that they often expect it in all situations, forgetting that the Constitutional right to free speech actually has several limitations. 160 Most people
know the popular analogy that “free speech would not protect a man in
falsely shouting fire in a theatre.” 161 But there are other narrow categories
of speech that the First Amendment does not protect, including speech that
incites lawless action, fighting words, true threats, and libel. 162 The limitation that is often forgotten, however, is that the Constitutional right to free
speech—subject to all limitations, of course—is only guaranteed from the
155. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
156. Alex Cook, Americans Say Freedom of Speech is the Most Important Constitutional
Right, According to FindLaw.com Survey for Law Day, May 1, FINDLAW (Apr. 30, 2015, 5:20),
https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/americans-say-freedom-of-speech-is-the-most-important-constitutional-right-according-to-findlawcom-survey-for-law-day-may-1-300074847.html
[https://perma.cc/2E52-KQLP].
157. Logan Chipkin, Free Speech is a Value, Not a Right, QUILLETTE (July 6, 2020),
https://quillette.com/2020/07/06/free-speech-is-a-value-not-a-right/
[https://perma.cc/8G7WPXMY].
158. AJ Willingham, The First Amendment Doesn’t Guarantee You the Rights You Think
It Does, CNN (Sept. 6, 2018, 7:36 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/04/27/politics/first-amendment-explainer-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/QL8Y-VNPC].
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
162. DAVID HUDSON, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 3:1 (2012).
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government. 163 Private entities are not obligated to guarantee or allow free
speech in most situations. 164
There are some narrow exceptions for when private entities may have
to provide certain rights that normally only the government is obligated to
provide. 165 Courts determine when this exception applies by using the judgemade state action doctrine. 166 The state action doctrine creates certain obligations for a private entity when it exercises “powers traditionally exclusively reserved to the State.” 167 The appellant in Marsh v. Alabama, 168 Grace
Marsh, was arrested by authorities in a town that was owned and operated
by a private company for distributing religious literature in the town. 169 The
Supreme Court of the United States found that because the town operated
just like a regular town, it was obligated to provide to the public the same
rights that a government-operated town would have to provide. 170 Thus, the
First Amendment allowed Marsh to distribute religious literature even in a
company town. 171
The state action doctrine, however, has its limits. Recently in Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck, the Supreme Court refused to extend the state action doctrine to a private nonprofit corporation that ran a
city’s public access channel. 172 A public access channel is a publicly-owned
television channel that is for public use but is generally administered by a

163. Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1926 (2019).
164. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 1033 (1976).
165. See Manhattan Cmty. Access, 139 S. Ct. at 1926.
166. Id.
167. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974).
168. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 502 (1946).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 508.
171. See id. at 508–09.
172. Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1926 (2019).
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private network. 173 The Court held that the private network “merely hosting
speech by others is not a traditional, exclusive public function.” 174 Therefore, the corporation that owned the public access channel was permitted to
exercise editorial discretion and censor content that was critical of it. 175
Because of the narrow scope of the state action doctrine, by the time
the Ninth Circuit had to decide Prager University, 176 the decision was
clear—YouTube, by hosting videos, did not perform a function that was traditionally reserved for government entities. 177 Prager University attempted
to argue that YouTube became a state actor when it hosted public speech. 178
However, the Ninth Circuit easily analogized the argument to the one that
failed in Halleck, and held that the state action doctrine did not mandate
YouTube to provide First Amendment protections to its users. 179 It was not
enough that hosting videos on a platform is a function that the government
has performed at some point. 180 For YouTube to become a state actor, video
hosting would have to be a function traditionally exclusive to the government. 181 Simply hosting public speech did not “transform” YouTube into a
public forum. 182 Like YouTube, Facebook and Twitter are private entities
that host public speech. Therefore, courts are not likely to require them to
provide First Amendment protections either.
173. Public, Educational, and Governmental Access Channels (“PEG Channels”), FCC
(Dec. 9, 2015) https://www.fcc.gov/media/public-educational-and-governmental-access-channelspeg-channels [https://perma.cc/CM9Q-8Y55].
174. Manhattan Cmty. Access, 139 S. Ct. at 1930.
175. Id. at 1930–31.
176. Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, 951 F.3d 991, 997 n.3 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing to six different cases in other Circuits that refused to find that social media platforms, including Facebook
and YouTube, were public forums or state across).
177. Id. at 998.
178. Id. at 997–98.
179. Id. at 998–99.
180. Id. at 997.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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The right to free speech is a valuable right at the cornerstone of American culture. However, arguing that the First Amendment protects the ability
to say absolutely anything online is an easy argument for courts to strike
down. Precedent establishes that social media companies do not provide a
government service. 183 Thus, the right to free speech outlined in the First
Amendment is not the correct tool to use to solve the visceral reaction Americans have toward internet censorship.

B. Government Regulation of Content Moderation is Ineffective at
Best and Harmful at Worst
In 2018, Google’s Chief Executive Officer, Sudar Pichai, testified in
front of Congress for three and a half hours. 184 The hearing was meant to
address Google’s alleged anti-conservative bias. 185 Some of the many
strange questions Pichai had to answer were questions about why a photograph of President Trump appears as a top result in a Google image search
for the word “idiot” and whether Google “knew” if someone moved from
one end of a room to the other. 186 Facebook Chief Executive Officer Mark
Zuckerberg also answered similar questions in a congressional hearing earlier that year. 187 Media coverage of the hearings mostly consisted of jokes
about the low technical literacy of members of Congress and upheld a general consensus that the government is not well-equipped to regulate large
technology companies. 188
183. See id.
184. Minda Zetlin, Google CEO Sundar Pichai Spent 3 1/2 Hours Before Congress. Here
are the Strangest Things They Asked, INC. (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.inc.com/minda-zetlin
/google-ceo-sundar-pichai-congress-representatives-hearings-funny-stupid-questions.html [http://
archive.today/krcor].
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Emily Stewart, Lawmakers Seem Confused About What Facebook Does – And How
to Fix It, VOX (Apr. 10, 2018, 7:50 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/4/10
/17222062/mark-zuckerbewestrg-testimony-graham-facebook-regulations
[http://archive.today
/cRWtw].
188. E.g., Margaret Sullivan, Members of Congress Can’t Possibly Regulate Facebook.
They Don’t Understand It, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2018, 3:42 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/members-of-congress-cant-possibly-regulate-facebook-they-dont-understand-it/2018/04/10/27fa163e-3cd1-11e8-8d53-eba0ed2371cc_story.html
[https://perma.cc
/F9NT-D4WX]; Cecelia Kang et al., Knowledge Gap Hinders Ability of Congress to Regulate

MIKAELYAN_MACROS_V4.5 (DO NOT DELETE)

208

3/2/2021 11:28 PM

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:2

Of course, the argument that the government cannot regulate an industry simply because it is large and complex is not only inaccurate, but dangerous. Many large and complex industries are regulated, such as the food industry, the pharmaceutical industry, and the financial industry. To uphold a
standard that complex industries are beyond regulation could create an environment where technology companies engage in bad faith practices and take
advantage of their users with impunity.
Nevertheless, the hearings demonstrate that technological literacy for
the top lawmakers in the country is low. Given that in less than two decades,
platforms went from inception to use by 72% of all Americans, it would be
a mistake to undertake regulation of social media platforms without understanding their nuances. 189 In addition, regulators, platforms, content creators, and users all have an interest in what content moderation looks like.
Regulators and politicians have an especially strong interest, given that
Americans increasingly use social media to connect with political figures. 190
A combination of low technical literacy and a strong personal stake in
content moderation is a recipe for oppressive legislation that stifles speech.
Congressional attempts to regulate Section 230 thus far do little to instill
faith in the government’s ability to regulate platforms without such negative
consequences. For example, FOSTA-SESTA failed to protect victims of sex
trafficking or reduce the incidence of sex work as intended. 191 Instead, it led
to platforms creating stricter community guidelines and taking down content
meant to help victims of sex trafficking, thus making it more difficult for sex

Silicon Valley, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/12/business/congress-facebook-regulation.html [https://perma.cc/Z3L4-WV9T].
189. Social Media Fact Sheet, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 12, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-sheet/social-media/ [https://perma.cc/94AM-9V3A].
190. Monica Anderson, More Americans Are Using Social Media to Connect With Politicians, PEW RES. CTR. (May 19, 2015), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/05/19/moreamericans-are-using-social-media-to-connect-with-politicians/ [https://perma.cc/9RVN-BXQ2].
191. Karol Markowicz, Congress’ awful anti-sex-trafficking law has only put sex workers
in danger and wasted taxpayer money, BUS. INSIDER (July 14, 2019, 12:38 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/fosta-sesta-anti-sex-trafficking-law-has-been-failure-opinion-2019-7
[https://
perma.cc/RBU4-SRYV]; Karen Gullo & David Greene, With FOSTA Already Leading to Censorship, Plaintiffs Are Seeking Reinstatement of Their Lawsuit Challenging the Law’s Constitutionality, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 1, 2019), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/02/fosta-alreadyleading-censorship-we-are-seeking-reinstatement-our-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/68BR-EYKS].
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workers to “share information or warn each other away from violent clients.” 192
Like FOSTA-SESTA, the EARN IT Act raises content moderation
freedom concerns under the guise of preventing child sexual exploitation. 193
The First Amendment provides interactive computer services with editorial
authority over the content posted on their platforms. 194 The EARN IT Act
threatens editorial authority by pressuring platforms to create content moderation standards based on suggestions by the EARN IT Act’s Commission
that go beyond simply requiring platforms to ban unlawful content. 195
The EARN IT Act’s potential problems with vagueness and overbreadth also pose dangers to the First Amendment rights of interactive computer services. 196 Vagueness in law refers to specificity—“[a] statute regulating behavior must be specific enough to allow ordinary people to
understand what conduct is prohibited and to prevent arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement.” 197 Overbreadth, on the other hand, refers to law that is
overly broad in scope. 198 The EARN IT Act imposes “vague and expansive

192. Markowicz, supra at 191; Gullo & Greene, supra note 191.
193. Letter from Sophia Cope & Aaron Mackey, Staff Attorneys, Electronic Frontier Foundation to Senate Judiciary Comm. (Mar. 9, 2020), https://www.eff.org/document/eff-earn-it-actfirst-amendment-letter-sjc [https://perma.cc/9393-GL6D].
194. Id.; Miami Herald Publ’g Co., Inc. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
195. The Electronic Frontier Foundation, a non-profit organization that works to protect
online free speech and privacy, wrote a letter to Congress detailing its concerns that the law is not
narrowly tailored enough to pass constitutional scrutiny. The letter identified as concerns “[t]he
‘best practices,’ [that] will govern how online service providers must prevent, identify, disrupt, and
report child sexual exploitation; how they must work with ‘non-profit organizations and other providers of interactive computer services to preserve, remove from view, and report child sexual exploitation;’ how they must implement ‘a standard rating and categorization system to identify the
type and severity of child sexual abuse material;’ and how they must employ ‘age rating and age
gating systems to reduce child sexual exploitation.’” Letter from Sophia Cope & Aaron Mackey
to Senate Judiciary Comm., supra note 193.
196. Aaron H. Caplan, Free Speech and Civil Harassment Orders, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 781,
781 (2013) (explaining that vagueness and overbreadth in statutes pose concerns to First Amendment protections).
197. Id. at 810.
198. Id. at 817.
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liability for user-generated content.” 199 The original version of the EARN
IT Act required platforms to “earn” their Section 230 protections by taking
steps to prevent child sexual exploitation based on a set of undefined “best
practices” and creating a safe harbor for interactive computer services that
followed the Commission’s “best practices.” 200 The latest version of the
EARN IT Act removes the safe harbor and does not specify whether platforms will have to “earn” their Section 230 protection. 201 It does, however,
create liability for interactive computer services pursuant to child sexual exploitation laws from all 50 states, creating “potential offenses that will encompass a wide variety of state laws that apply different legal standards to
the same conduct.” 202 This sort of broad liability will likely result in the
same type of blanket censorship caused by FOSTA-SESTA and may “condition the granting of a governmental privilege [of editorial authority] on
individuals or entities doing things that amount to a violation of their First
Amendment rights.” 203
Thus, full government control of platform content moderation could be
hindered by lack of understanding or vague and overly broad requirements.
As FOSTA-SESTA and the EARN IT Act demonstrate, such a model is ineffective at best and harmful at worst.

C. The Solution is Government-Industry Cooperation with a Focus
on Transparency, Consistency, and Accountability
The current method of industry self-regulation in the content moderation arena is unlikely to last. Users grow frustrated with vague and inconsistent community guidelines and Congress and the DOJ have started to
slowly chip away at Section 230 protections for platforms. But increasing
199. Emma Llansó, Amendments to EARN IT Act Can’t Fix the Bill’s Fundamental Flaws,
CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (July 1, 2020), https://cdt.org/insights/amendments-to-earn-it-actcant-fix-the-bills-fundamental-flaws/ [https://perma.cc/CC7L-CTNX].
193.

200. Letter from Sophia Cope & Aaron Mackey to Senate Judiciary Comm., supra note
201. See EARN IT Act of 2020, S. 3398, 116th Cong. (2020).
202. Id.; Llansó, supra note 199.

203. Sophia Cope, Aaron Mackey, & Andrew Crocker, The EARN IT Act Violates the Constitution, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/03/earnit-act-violates-constitution [https://perma.cc/NHN9-6BNT].
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criminal liability for platforms is not the best method if we value free speech
and open dialogue on platforms.
The advent of social media platforms reimagined what social interaction and connection could look like. An effective content moderation model
must also reimagine possible solutions. This Note asserts that the best
method of content moderation is a committee (“Committee”) that brings together regulators, platforms, content creators, users, and third-party technology experts to propose a set of content moderation best practices that are
voluntary to undertake that are voluntary to undertake. This Committee
should be different from the EARN IT Act’s Commission, which is mainly
comprised of law enforcement and seeks to create guidelines for platforms
to avoid criminal liability. 204
The role of the Committee proposed here is to create clear content moderation standards, regularly update and publish the standards, and publicly
rate platforms based on their adherence to the standards. 205 The Committee
should create a website where the best practices are published and where
platforms and other websites that choose to adopt the best practices may be
reported. Although platforms may adopt the standards on a voluntary basis,
adoption with minimal changes will create clear content moderation expectations for users and creators.
The guiding principles of the standards must address what current content moderation guidelines lack: transparency, consistency, and accountability. Transparency will address the uncertainty creators experience when
they upload content. Community guidelines today are too often described as
a “black box,” where creators are uncertain as to whether their content will
remain posted or whether it will get removed, demonetized, or restricted. 206
Although platforms may argue that releasing their proprietary algorithms and
rules could expose their trade secrets, the issue could be remedied if “the

204. S. 3398, 116th Cong. § 3(c)(2) (2020).
205. Notably, Facebook has already created a similar committee, called the Oversight
Board, to propose content moderation standards for Facebook. The committee proposed by this
article takes the concept a step further by creating consistent standards across platforms so that
users can expect certain baseline content moderation rules across the many planforms that they use.
Nick Clegg, Welcoming the Oversight Board, FACEBOOK (May 6, 2020) https://about.fb.com/news
/2020/05/welcoming-the-oversight-board/ [https://perma.cc/7CNP-HMF7].
206. Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Online Content Moderation, 106 GEO. L.J. 1353, 1377
(2018).

MIKAELYAN_MACROS_V4.5 (DO NOT DELETE)

212

3/2/2021 11:28 PM

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:2

public disclosures were general rather than granular in nature.” 207 With
standards clearly disclosed, creators could better understand what content is
permissible.
Consistency will address standards that change frequently and abruptly. President Trump’s executive order and tweet to “REVOKE 230” 208
was likely due to Twitter’s inconsistent enforcement standards. Twitter had
never flagged a post of his as potentially misleading before, and, suddenly,
it decided to start flagging when President Trump’s rhetoric contained misinformation in a way it had never done before. 209 Therefore, consistency
may quell government attempts to regulate Section 230, because such attempts generally focus on creating more predictability in the sort of content
platforms do and do not allow. Further, since each platform currently creates
its own standards, what is acceptable on one platform may be unacceptable
on another. Though there is value in some variety from platform to platform,
a consistent set of basic standards that serve as a floor would help create the
predictability that is lacking across platforms. To address issues with consistency, the Committee must create and update standards on a regular schedule instead of changing them suddenly.
Finally, accountability will address the lack of consequences to platforms for inconsistent and opaque community guidelines without threatening
their Section 230 protections. As previously described, the Committee must
have a system in which it publicly ranks platforms and websites based on
their adherence to the published best practices. This method seeks to incentivize platforms to comply by rewarding them with a high score for transparent and consistent content moderation standards without taking away their
rights to moderate content as they please under Section 230. 210 In addition,
the ranking system will serve as an important resource for content creators
when deciding on which platforms to publish content. Platforms that have
207. Id. at 1384.
208. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (May 29, 2020, 8:15 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1266387743996870656 [https://archive.is/iBmsK].
209. Nicholas Reimann, Twitter Fact-Checks President Trump for the First Time, FORBES
(May 26, 2020, 5:56 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicholasreimann/2020/05/26/twitter-factchecks-president-trump-for-the-first-time/#752786f82905 [https://perma.cc/42D8-LGR8].
210. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (providing that platforms shall not be treated as publishers of
user-generated content); 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (protecting platforms from civil liability for steps
taken to moderate most content).
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more transparent and consistent rules are more appealing to creators that derive income from platforms and have the power to push users from one platform to another. 211
This proposed committee would not be the first government-industry
joint imitative in the technology space. A similar framework was used to
create the cybersecurity framework of the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (“NIST”). 212 “The [NIST] [f]ramework is voluntary guidance,
based on existing standards, guidelines, and practices for organizations to
better manage and reduce cybersecurity risk.” 213 The framework was first
developed in 2014 and was involved collaboration from “industry, academia,
and government stakeholders” and used “workshops, extensive outreach and
consultation, and a public comment process” to create the final product.214
In 2015, 30% of United States companies used the NIST framework, a number projected to increase to 50% by 2020. 215 The NIST framework provides
all stakeholders involved with clear guidance on cybersecurity issues and
gives both regulators and industry a hand in framing best practices.
Today, regulators, platforms, users, and creators all want more control
over what content moderation looks like. What if, instead, content moderation involved input from all of these groups? The Committee proposed in
this Note provides regulators with a set of clear best practices they can encourage, provides platforms with a seat at the table to decide how to moderate their own content, and provides users and creators with predictable and
solid rules to rely on when deciding how and where to publish content.
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V. CONCLUSION
In the backdrop of a global pandemic 216 and mass civil unrest, 217 President Trump propelled the issue of content moderation into public discourse
in 2020. 218 The current content moderation method of complete platform
self-regulation, however, has created unrest and dissatisfaction for regulators, platforms, content creators, and users alike. 219
Popular methods proposed instead of self-regulation are expanding the
First Amendment’s free speech protections and full control by the government. However, both methods have inherent failings. First Amendment free
speech protections consistently fail in courts because platforms are private
entities with the power to regulate their own content. 220 Government-run
solutions, on the other hand, have constitutional concerns and are often illinformed and oppressive. 221 However, a third method is available—government-industry cooperation. Because social media is now a part of the daily
lives of most Americans, the public has a stake in what content moderation
looks like. A system of joint governance gives all interested parties a seat at
the table and ensures that the needs of all parties are taken into account.
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